U.S. Supreme Court Lightens Police Burden Under Miranda

Posted By Steven J. Richardson on June 2, 2010

Yesterday’s decision by the US Supreme Court in Berghuis v. Thompkins has been in the news quite a bit, as it will have quite an impact on 5th amendment cases in the future and will certainly, as dissenting Justice Sotomayor observed, “turn Miranda upside down.”  I have talked about Miranda in other posts, but this case really puts everyone on notice of what they have to do to protect their rights against self-incrimination.  To the point: Don’t be shy, speak up.  Tell them you want a lawyer!

Prior to this case, the burden was on the police to show a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of Miranda.  Many police departments were told not to start questioning a suspect until that person signed a waiver form.  Now, as Justice Kennedy observed in his opinion for the court, a waiver form is not required before police start questioning a suspect.

In this case, the defendant was arrested in connection with a shooting outside a mall in Southfield, Michigan.  The police read him his rights, and Thompkins indicated that he understood those rights.  He just didn’t sign the form.  He was then questioned for almost three hours, whereupon when asked if he prayed to God to forgive him for the shooting, he said “Yes.”  He did not sign a confession nor say anything else, but the damage had been done; he was convicted.

Although the conviction was overturned by the US Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction setting forth this standard: Someone who wants to invoke his rights under Miranda must make an “unambiguous” statement to that effect.  Had Thompkins said he wanted to remain silent, he would have been protected.  In the dissent, Justice Sotomayor said that this rule would be confusing in practice.  She said, “Criminal suspects must now unambiguously invoke their right to remain silent — which, counterintuitively, requires them to speak.”

On the one hand, the 5th Amendment right, as protected under Miranda, has been enforced strictly for decades.  It is a very basic right that we hold dear.  On the other hand, the question becomes, who carries the burden to protect it?  What are the police, those charged with investigating crimes and finding the perpetrators, expected to do?  What about the defendant?  Where is his obligation to speak up?  The real issue here is one of proofs, though, not who has the burden.  Written waivers of Miranda are more unequivocal than a verbal invocation of the right.  What happens in the absence of a writing, or a videotape of the interrogation, when a defendant says he told the police that he didn’t want to answer questions, and wanted a lawyer, and the police say he didn’t?  Having clear rules on what needs to be said when is good for both sides, but how do you prove that the rules were followed under this recent decision?

Was the court right on easing the burden on the police and expecting suspects to speak up?  Or should they have continued the practice to date of throwing that responsibility upon the police?  What do you think?  Leave your comments below.

Bankruptcy Filing Hazardous to Your Money in a Wells Fargo or Wachovia Account

Posted By Steven J. Richardson on June 1, 2010

When someone files bankruptcy, they must list all of their assets, including money in their bank accounts.  Exemptions are also available to protect those assets from the trustee, who might otherwise use the value of said asset to pay debts.   The trustee, however, has a right to object to those exemptions by a certain deadline.  A problem has arisen, however, with certain banks who want to “help out” the trustees when one of their depositors files for bankruptcy, even when said depositor does not owe that bank any money.

Wells Fargo Bank has for several years taken the position that if a depositor files for bankruptcy, then any account they have with the bank is an asset of the estate and must be “preserved for the trustee” (i.e. frozen).  You say that those moneys in your checking account were fully exempted?  Well sure, but the trustee has until xx date to object, so we will just keep the account frozen until then to see what happens!  When Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia Bank, they started doing it too.  Don’t believe it?  Check out this letter from Wachovia dated this month to a Georgia bankruptcy attorney.

Quite frankly, the trustee doesn’t need the bank’s help.  He or she has other ways to enforce his or her position and force a disgorgement of funds from the debtors should the need arise.  The bottom line is, if you are considering filing bankruptcy and have money in either of these institutions, move your money before you file! You may end up with frozen funds and a mortgage/car/utility payment that bounced.

Thanks to Robert Weed in Virginia for this hot tip!

Relief Now Available from Fines for Failure to Pay Surcharges

Posted By Steven J. Richardson on May 27, 2010

Prior to January 16, 2010, if you owed motor vehicle surcharges for a conviction like drunk driving, failed to pay them, and as a result had your driver’s license suspended, you would be assessed an additional $3,000 fine.  Even worse, this liability for the fine would be automatically reduced to a judgment against you until you paid it in full.  What’s worse, judgments like these can also act as liens against real estate.  However, the New Jersey legislature has repealed this law, thus freeing drivers from an additional, rather onerous, burden to getting their licenses restored.  If you have been assessed this fine since January 16th, you should  talk to an attorney and move for a sentence reconsideration.

This change in the law is also very important to people who are filing a chapter 13 bankruptcy in order to pay surcharges and get their licenses restored.  Fines are treated differently under the law than surcharges, and can be more difficult to address.   Thus this repeal makes that process much easier.  if you are contemplating filing for bankruptcy to get your license restored, talk to your attorney about this; it can make a big difference.

Warrantless Search by Police Limited on “Reasonable Suspicion.”

Posted By Steven J. Richardson on May 24, 2010

On May 21, 2010, the New Jersey Appellate Division ruled that police cannot enter and search a private residence with only a “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity (the standard under Terry v. Ohio, a 1968 U.S. Supreme Court case).  In the case of State v. Jefferson, police officers were investigating drug dealing and possible gun-play, which led them to a private residence where they saw the defendant inside. Although they remained outside, the police quickly developed sufficient suspicion to detain the defendant for questioning, and made a warrantless entry into his home.  While this was going on, the defendant resisted the police, was arrested and searched.  During this search, the police found drugs.  However, after securing the defendant, the police re-entered the residence without a warrant and discovered additional criminal evidence.

The Court ruled that although the initially discovered drugs were admissible, because they were found during a search incident to a lawful arrest, it suppressed the evidence later discovered in the home.  This line of distinction drawn by the court is not an unusual one.  Police have long been able to search suspects  placed under arrest for such reasons as to be sure that they are not carrying weapons.  In a traffic stop, the search can go beyond the person of the defendant to the car, if certain areas of the vehicle were within his or her reach.   Also, if the car is impounded, many times an inventory of its contents by the police will reveal criminal evidence. However, in this case the police had no constitutional justification to enter the defendant’s residence without a warrant after the arrest.  At the very least, they could have taken the defendant into custody, then come back later with a warrant, if they had sufficient probable cause.   They did not.  Thus the evidence was suppressed.

NJ Supreme Court to Consider Whether Refusal = DUI

Posted By Steven J. Richardson on May 20, 2010

In a February post, I reported on an Appellate Division ruling that a conviction for refusal to submit to a breath test equates to a prior DUI for sentencing purposes if that person is subsequently convicted of drunk driving.  In other words, if someone is convicted of drunk driving for the first time, but had a prior conviction for refusal, he would be sentenced as a second offender on the DUI!  Well, it looks like the State Supreme Court is going to weigh in on this.  On May 7, the court decided to hear the matter of State v. Ciancaglini.  A docket number has been assigned, but there is no date yet for oral argument.  Let’s hope that the court sees reason in this and reverses this unjust finding.